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COMMENTS
CARLSON V. GREEN: THE INFERENCE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSE OF ACTION DESPITE THE
AVAILABILITY OF A FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
REMEDY
By enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),1 Congress
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for the negli-
gent or wrongful acts of its employees. A 1974 amendment2 broad-
ened the government's liability by allowing suits based on certain
intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers.s
This action came just three years after the Supreme Court, in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,4 had inferred a similar
federal common law right to recover damages from federal officials
who violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights.5
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 843-44 (1946) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)). Section 1346(b) provides:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages. . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury.. . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
2. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1970)).
3. Section 2680(h) excepts most intentional torts from the government's waiver of
liability. The 1974 amendment to § 2680(h) limited this exception by adding the following
language:
[W]ith regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising ... out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). For a history and analysis of the 1974 amendment, see Boger,
Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An
Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rav. 497 (1976).
4. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
5. Id. Bivens involved the inference of a cause of action for violations of the fourth
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A problem arises when a particular tortious act creates causes of
action under both the Bivens rationale and the FTCA. In such a
situation, a plaintiff may prefer to proceed against the United
States under the FTCA, seeking the obvious advantages of a deep-
pocketed defendant. Yet certain elements of the Bivens-style ac-
tion, such as the availability of punitive damages' and a jury trial,7
are absent in an FTCA suit." Should a plaintiff find these features
attractive, he may choose to sue the individual employees, despite
the available remedy against the government.9 Facing such a
choice, Marie Green chose the Bivens remedy, and in Carlson v.
Green,20 the Supreme Court addressed the propriety of judicial in-
ference of a constitutional cause of action against federal employ-
ees when an FTCA remedy against the United States is also
available.11
The controversy in Carlson began when Joseph Jones, Jr., a pris-
oner at the Federal Correction Center in Terre Haute, Indiana re-
ceived inadequate medical care that allegedly caused his death. 2
Marie Green, Jones' mother and the administratrix of his estate,
filed suit against the responsible prison officials alleging that they
amendment. Courts have expanded the Bivens rationale to allow such suits based on viola-
tions of other constitutional provisions. See Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope
of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HAS-
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 531, 566-72 (1977).
6. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that "our decisions,
although not expressly addressing and deciding the question, indicate that punitive damages
may be awarded in a Bivens suit." Id. at 1473.
7. See id. at 1474.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 prohibits punitive damages in FTCA suits. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
Section 2402 of the same title disallows jury trials in FTCA suits. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
For a comparison of the FTCA and Bivens remedies, see Comment, Loe v. Armistead: The
Availability of an Alternative Remedy as a Bar to Extending Bivens, 20 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 393, 407-12 (1978).
9. The plaintiff could sue the government employee first, and then proceed to sue the
United States for any portion of the original judgment that the employee-defendant had not
satisfied. Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 3, at 537. Under § 2676, however, a judg-
ment against the United States in an action brought under the FTCA bars subsequent ac-
tions, based on the same claim, against the offending official. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1976).
10. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
11. Id. at 17-23. The Court also addressed the issue of whether a state statute prohibiting
the survivorship of an action prevented a Bivens claim. The Court held that a uniform
federal rule of survivorship was necessary to redress the constitutional deprivation. Id. at
23-25. This issue is beyond the limited scope of this Comment.
12. Id. at 16 n.1.
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caused his death and violated his due process, equal protection,
and eighth amendment rights.13 Although neither lower court had
addressed the issue, the Supreme Court held that a Bivens remedy
inferable from the eighth amendment was available even though
the plaintiff's allegations also could support a suit against the
United States under the FTCA.14
PRE-Carlson TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE
Prior to Carlson, several lower federal courts had considered the
inference of constitutional remedies when FTCA remedies are
available. In Torres v. Taylor,'5 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that the compensation
provided by the FTCA eliminated any need for a constitutional
cause of action.' 6 The court stated that "federal courts should not
imply causes of action under the Constitution where there is al-
ready an adequate remedy for the constitutional deprivations."'' 7
The court dismissed the claim without prejudice to the plaintiff's
right to seek relief under the FTCA.18
Conversely, in Hernandez v. Lattimore,9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the Torres ratio-
nale and allowed a direct cause of action against federal prison offi-
cials.2" The legislative intent of the 1974 amendment to the FTCA
was a key element in the court's analysis.2 ' The Senate Report that
accompanied the amendment stated that the amendment "should
be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case. '22 Finding this ex-
0
13. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court upheld the finding of both lower courts that Mrs. Green
effectively had pleaded a violation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. Id. at 17-18. The lower courts had relied on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), in which the court held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment.
Id. at 104.
14. 446 U.S. at 18.
15. 456 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
16. Id. at 954.
17. Id. at 953.
18. Id. at 955.
19. 612 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 62. The court remanded the case for a determination of the merits of the plain-
tiffs claim. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 66-67.
22. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
1981]
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pression of congressional intent determinative, the court stated
that Congress meant the amendment to "provide a remedy against
the federal government in addition to, but not wholly in place of,
the private cause of action created by Bivens.' '2s Consequently, the
court granted a Bivens cause of action despite the availability of an
FTCA suit.24
In Moriani v. Hunter,25 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected its previous decision in
Torres and followed the Hernandez analysis. The court noted that
constitutional causes of action generally should be inferred only
when no alternative remedy exists.2 6 Nonetheless, the court viewed
the language of the Senate Report accompanying the 1974 amend-
ment to the FTCA as a justification for violating the general rule.27
The Report's statement that the FTCA was a counterpart to Biv-
ens remedies 28 took priority over the rule, and the court inferred
an action for damages against the individual officers directly from
the Constitution.29
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, in Thornwell v. United States,30 inferred a constitu-
tional cause of action notwithstanding the existence of the FTCA 1
Legislative intent played a key role in the court's analysis, 2 as did
the deterrent effect of personal liability.3 Moreover, the court felt
NEws 2789, 2791.
23. 612 F.2d at 67.
24. Id. at 68.
25. No. 77-1599 (S.D.N.Y., July 16, 1979).
26. Id., slip op. at _.
27. Id. After reciting the general rule, the court stated: "But where Congress explicitly
states that it does not wish the availability of a particular statutory remedy to enter into the
analysis when courts weigh the need for an implied constitutional damage remedy, it would
seem that the express instruction controls." Id.
28. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
29. No. 77-1599, slip op. at - (S.D.N.Y., July 16, 1979).
30. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
31. Id. at 353-55.
32. Id. at 354-55.
33. Id. at 355. The court stated: "In addition, an exclusive remedy under the Act provides
a less effective deterrent against constitutional violators than a direct action against federal
officials." Id. Most authorities recognize the deterrent effect of personal liability on poten-
tially tort-feasant government employees. See Bermann, Integrating Governmental and
Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1977); Vaughn, The Personal
Accountability of Public Employees, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 85, 86-87 (1975).
564 [Vol. 22:561
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that it could not categorize accurately the defendants' acts34 as one
of the traditional common law torts covered by the FTCA; rather,
"the only tort which is capable of describing this course of conduct
is one based upon the fifth amendment's guarantee[s]."3 5
Carlson v- Green
Following Hernandez, Moriani, and Thornwell, the Court in
Carlson held that the availability of an FTCA remedy does not
pre-empt a Bivens remedy against federal officials. 6 Relying on its
earlier decision in Bivens, the Supreme Court enunciated a two
part test for determining when a court should infer causes of ac-
tion from the Constitution. Speaking for the Court, Justice Bren-
nan stated that a Bivens cause of action
may be defeated in a particular case ... in two situations. The
first is when defendants demonstrate "special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." The
second is when defendants show that Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective.3 7
The Court spent little time in determining the absence of "spe-
cial factors counselling hesitation."8 Offering only one example of
a special factor, Justice Brennan found no independent status on
the part of the defendants that might render them invulnerable to
judicial remedies.39
34. In Thornwell, the defendants subjected the plaintiff to an involuntary "covert pro-
gram in human experimentation." 471 F. Supp. at 346. The program consisted of LSD injec-
tions and "physical and mental degradation." Id.
35. Id. at 355.
36. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980).
37. Id. at 20 (citations omitted) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971)).
38. Id. at 19. The Court's application of this part of the test took only four sentences of
the opinion.
39. Id. Justice Brennan cited Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979), in stating that
the case contained no special factors counselling hesitation. In Davis, the Court implied a
cause of action against a congressman, holding that the Speech or Debate clause protections
were sufficient to dispel special factors counselling hesitation. Id. at 246.
Justice Brennan also mentioned that to require a federal official to defend a suit might
interfere with the performance of official duties, but he dismissed the problem by referring
1981] 565
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The Court gave a more lengthy consideration to determining
whether Congress explicitly had declared the FTCA to be an
equally effective substitute for the Bivens cause of action.40 The
Court commented that Congress need not have uttered any partic-
ular words; rather, Congress must have "indicated that it intends
the statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the
Bivens remedy. '41 Focusing on the 1974 amendment's legislative
history, the Court found no indication that plaintiffs must seek re-
lief under the FTCA instead of suing the offending individuals;42
rather, the Court found a congressional intent to make both the
Bivens and FTCA remedies available.43 The Court gave great
weight to one statement in the Senate Report:
"[Alfter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent indi-
viduals who are subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have
a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the
Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should be
viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty
[sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to
make the Government independently liable in damages. .... ,,44
To add support to its finding of congressional intent, the Court
cited several statutory provisions 45 illustrating that "Congress fol-
to the qualified immunity granted federal officials in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
446 U.S. at 19.
Other "special factors" have been advanced. In Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.
1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that "[t]he existence
of civil service remedies, coupled with the apparent anomaly of a parallel Bivens style rem-
edy" should be treated as a special factor counselling hesitation. Id. at 357. One commenta-
tor has suggested that the enactment of the 1974 intentional torts amendment should be
such a special factor. Comment, supra note 8, at 404.
40. 446 U.S. at 19-23.
41. Id. at 19 n.5.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 19-20.
44. Id. at 20. (quoting S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2789, 2791). After quoting from the Senate Report, the Court
stated that "[i]n the absence of a contrary expression from Congress," it would interpret
§ 2680(h) as allowing an action against the United States and individual officials. Id.
45. Id. at 20. The Court cited the following statutory provisions: 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a)
(1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 233(a), 2458a (1976), 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1976), and 22 U.S.C. § 817(a)
(1976), all expressly stating that the FTCA is the sole remedy in cases of medical malprac-
tice by certain government employees; 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976) (FTCA is the exclusive
remedy for injuries caused by the operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); 42
[Vol. 22:561
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lows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make
FTCA an exclusive remedy. 4 6 In addition, noting four advantages
of the Bivens remedy over the FTCA remedy,47 the Court reasoned
that Congress did not intend to deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of
a Bivens remedy.48 Consequently, the defendants in Carlson not
only failed to demonstrate the existence of any special factors
counselling hesitation, but they also failed to produce an explicit
congressional declaration that an alternative remedy was a substi-
tute for recovery on a Bivens claim. Having failed to satisfy either
strand of the Carlson test, the defendants were subject to personal
liability.49
The Supreme Court's analysis in Carlson contrasts sharply with
the district court's reasoning in Torres. In Torres, the inquiry fo-
cused on the existence of adequate and sufficient alternative reme-
dies. 50 The court determined that the FTCA would compensate the
plaintiff for his injuries, and thus, a Bivens cause of action was
superfluous.5 1 The Carlson test eschewed such an independent
evaluation of alternative remedies; rather, the test focused on de-
termining congressional intent.52 Although the Court did compare
several aspects of the Bivens and FTCA remedies,s concluding
that the "FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens' consti-
tutional rights, '' 4 the Court made this determination solely for the
purpose of discovering the legislative intent behind the 1974
amendment.55 Therefore, the Carlson analysis was not an indepen-
U.S.C. § 247b(k) (1976) (FTCA is the exclusive remedy against manufacturers of swine flu
vaccine).
46. 446 U.S. at 20.
47. The Court listed the benefits to a plaintiff of a Bivens remedy over an FTCA action:
the Bivens remedy is a more effective deterrent; punitive damages are allowed only in
Bivens suits; jury trials are available solely in Bivens suits; and FTCA suits are subject to
state law, whereas Bivens suits are governed by uniform federal law. Id. at 21-25. In his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist denied either the existence or the importance of each of the ad-
vantages listed by the majority. Id. at 44-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See notes 67-68 &
accompanying text infra.
48. 446 U.S. at 20-21.
49. See id. at 18-23.
50. See Torres v. Taylor, 456 F. Supp. 951, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
51. Id. at 954.
52. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
53. 446 U.S. at 20-23. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
54. 446 U.S. at 23.
55. The Court stated: "Four additional factors, each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is
1981]
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dent judicial decision on the existence of an adequate alternative
remedy.
As in Hernandez, Moriani, and Thornwell, the Court in Carlson
relied heavily on legislative intent in holding that the inference of
a Bivens cause of action is appropriate despite the availability of
the FTCA.5 6 Unlike the earlier cases, however, the Court developed
an analytic framework in Carlson for determining the availability
of constitutional causes of action. Using scattered language from
Bivens,57 the Court created an unambiguous two-prong test for the
first time.58 Unless defendants satisfy the test's requirements, a
Bivens remedy always will be available to victims of constitutional
torts committed by government officers. 9
In their separate opinions, Justices Powell and Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority opinion.60 Both Justice
Powell and Chief Justice attacked the Court's test. Justice Powell
found neither authority nor justification for creating such an abso-
lute standard"1 and found the mechanical nature of the test partic-
more effective than the FTCA remedy, also support our conclusion that Congress did not
intend to limit respondent to an FTCA action." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 18-23.
57. In Bivens, the Court stated, "The present case involves no special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). Later
on, the Court continued:
Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether
the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amend-
ment. For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons in-
jured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages. . . but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress.
Id. at 397.
58. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
59. The Court's test places the burdens of production and persuasion on the defendants.
The Bivens cause of action is "defeated" if defendants prove either strand of the test. 446
U.S. at 18-19. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted, "Today we are told that a
court must entertain a Bivens suit unless the action is 'defeated' in one of two specified
ways." Id. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, id. at 25, and the Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist filed dissents, id. at 30, 31.
61. Id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell cited two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions that contain language inconsistent with allowing constitutional causes of action, given
an alternate remedy. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court held that federal
officials, like state officials, are entitled to only a qualified immunity for their discretionary
acts. Id. at 500. At one point, the Court remarked, "The presence or absence of congres-
sional authorization for suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question
568
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ularly offensive.6 2 He viewed the test as an unjustifiable infringe-
ment of judicial discretion because courts must examine a large
number of policy considerations when determining whether to in-
fer a remedy from the Constitution.63
In his criticism of the Court's test, Chief Justice Burger noted
that the actual adequacy of the FTCA remedy was an "irrele-
vancy" in the Court's analysis.6 The Chief Justice stated that
under the Court's analysis, a Bivens cause of action against state
officials would be inferred despite the relief afforded by section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act.65 Indeed, the language of the Carlson
whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution."
Id. at 503.
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court inferred a constitutional damages
remedy for a violation of the fifth amendment's due process clause. Id. at 245-48. The Court
noted, however, that "were Congress to create equally effective alternative remedies, the
need for damages relief might be obviated." Id. at 248.
62. 446 U.S. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 28 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
64. Id. at 30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger illustrated that the Court's
test does not ask whether the alternate remedy is either adequate or equally effective;
rather, the test asks if Congress viewed the alternate remedy as equally effective and explic-
itly declared it effective.
65. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)). Several lower courts have refused to find a consti-
tutional cause of action and have referred to the existence of a remedy under § 1983. Cale v.
Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978) (Q 1983 remedy supported the court's refusal to
infer cause of action directly from the fourteenth amendment); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37
(1st Cir. 1977) (no right of action against municipality because of availability of relief under
§ 1983).
The case of Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded sub
nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), rev'd per curiam, Turpin v.
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979), illustrates the problems of inferring a constitutional
cause of action despite the existence of § 1983. In its first handling of the case, the Second
Circuit allowed suit under the fourteenth amendment against a municipality. See 579 F.2d
at 168. Noting that municipalities were not subject to liability under § 1983, the court cre-
ated a constitutional cause of action because no remedy for violations of constitutional
rights was avialable to the plaintiffs. Id. at 161-63. In Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), however, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may sue municipalities
directly under § 1983. Therefore, when Turpin was appealed to the Supreme Court, the
Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of Monell. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1979). In vacating and
remanding the case, the Court apparently thought that the statutory remedy recently made
available by Monell negated the need for a constitutional cause of action. Accordingly, on
remand, the Second Circuit held that, in light of the relief available under § 1983, it need
not infer a cause of action from the Constitution. 591 F.2d at 427.
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test need not apply only to cases involving Bivens and FTCA
causes of action. Rather, a court could apply the test whenever de-
fendants assert any federal statutory scheme as a bar to the infer-
ence of a Bivens cause of action.6
Justice Rehnquist not only questioned the four alleged advan-
tages of the Bivens remedy,67 but also attacked the validity of the
entire process of judicial inference of constitutional causes of ac-
tion."8 He asserted that in both Bivens and Carlson the Court had
66. Courts have denied Bivens causes of action because of available statutory remedies
other than § 1983. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980) (constitutional cause of
action for damages denied because of existence of civil service remedies); Mahone v. Wad-
dle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (refused to infer Bivens cause of action directly from the
fourteenth amendment because a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was available);
Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978) (constitutional cause of action for
damages denied because of relief available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
In Bush v. Lucas, 598 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1846
(1980), the Fifth Circuit denied a constitutional cause of action based on a federal em-
ployee's retaliatory demotion. The court based its holding on the existence of an alternate
remedy under civil service regulations. Id. at 961. The Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded the case to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Carlson v. Green,
demonstrating that Carlson will not apply solely to cases involving the FTCA as an alter-
nate remedy.
67. See 446 U.S. at 44-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a dissent twice as long as the
majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist attacked the four additional factors mentioned by the
majority as supporting the conclusion that Congress did not intend the FTCA as a substi-
tute for a Bivens action.
First, recovery against an individual in a Bivens action is insupportable according to Jus-
tice Rehnquist. In addition, even if a Bivens action deterred, he continued, other policy
considerations, notably the paralyzing effect on employees, could offset any marginal deter-
rence. Id. at 44-45. Second, Justice Rehnquist maintained that because the Court has never
reached the question whether punitive damages are available in either a Bivens or a § 1983
action, the failure of Congress to provide for punitive damages in the FTCA was meaning-
less. Id. at 47. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist noted that preventing a plaintiff from opting for
a jury trial in an FTCA action sheds no light on congressional intent because the majority
offered no reason why a judge is preferable to a jury. Id. at 48. Finally, Justice Rehnquist
observed that uniform rules need not govern liability of federal officers for violations of
constitutional rights. He pointed to the congressional determination to defer to state proce-
dural rules in the § 1983 context as illustrating that deterrence is not a significant federal
interest compelling uniformity. Id. at 48-49.
68. Id. at 34-44. Justice Rehnquist leveled his sharpest attack against inferring any con-
stitutional causes of action. He noted that although the majority relied on Bivens, the Court
provided neither reasoning on how Bivens, a fourth amendment case, supports the inference
of an eighth amendment cause of action nor guidance for deciding "when a constitutional
provision permits an inference that an individual may recover damages and when it does
not." Id. at 35.
In addition, Justice Rehnquist explained that the Court does not have the authority to
570
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overstepped its constitutional authority, stating that "the creation
of constitutional damage remedies involves policy considerations
that are more appropriately made by the Legislative rather than
the Judicial Branch of our Government." 9
THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF Carlson
To properly evaluate the effect of Carlson v. Green, an examina-
tion of the pre-Carlson legal environment is necessary. In recent
years, the number of Bivens actions has increased dramatically."0
Moreover, although originally most plaintiffs brought Bivens suits
against law enforcement or intelligence officials, plaintiffs increas-
ingly bring claims against other types of government employees. 1
As a result of these increases in the quantity and scope of suits
against government officials, many government employees alleg-
edly live in constant fear of personal liability.7 2 Government offi-
cials claim that with this rise in apprehension has come a decline
in employee morale, productivity, and effectiveness.73
Inconsistent with the fear alleged by government employees is
grant damage relief for constitutional violations absent congressional authorization. Justice
Rehnquist contrasted the majority's approach of inferring a constitutional cause of action
unless specifically prevented by Congress with recent cases declining to imply a statutory
cause of action unless Congress expressly provided it. Id. at 33-40 n.5 (citing Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979)). The court in Touche Ross and Transamerica, noted Justice Rehnquist, declined
to imply a damage remedy from the statutes' broad language, reversing the trend of infer-
ring such private rights of action, see, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Given the vitality of Borak at the time of Bivens, Justice Rehnquist doubted "that Mr.
Justice Harlan would today reach the same conclusion that he did in Bivens in 1971." 446
U.S. at 39-40 n.5. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that equitable author-
ity of the federal courts to grant necessary relief extends to damage awards for constitu-
tional violations. Id. at 42.
These and other issues raised by Justice Rehnquist are beyond the limited scope of this
Comment. Nonetheless, the problems discussed by his dissent reinforce the need for a legis-
lative solution. See notes 86-104 & accompanying text infra.
69. 446 U.S. at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS.
1, 1 (1979); Bermann, supra note 33, at 1180.
71. See Bell, supra note 70, at 1.
72. See id. at 7; Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 U.
RIcH. L. REv. 281, 295-96 (1980). According to one commentator, federal employees fear not
only the threat of actual liability but also the "exhausting burdens of discovery and the
possibility of pre-judgment liens on bank accounts, personalty and realty." Id.
73. See Bell, supra note 70, at 6; Dolan, supra note 72, at 296.
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the relative lack of success of plaintiffs in obtaining compensation
through the courts for injuries caused by federal employees.74 A
plaintiff must overcome several significant barriers if he is to gain
a judgment against either the individual official or the government.
Specifically, a plaintiff who sues the individual official must prove
that actual, compensable injuries resulted from the defendant's un-
lawful acts.7 5 Should the plaintiff prove such injuries, the defen-
dant still may avoid liability by asserting the qualified immunity of
government employees recognized in Butz v. Economou.78 Finally,
if the plaintiff should overcome all of these obstacles, he still faces
the task of collecting a judgment from a defendant who, because of
limited financial resources, may be judgment-proof.77
The chances of recovery against the government on a similar
claim are also discouraging."8 The discretionary function exception
of the FTCA 9 protects the government from liability for the dis-
cretionary acts of its agents.80 In addition, under Norton v. United
States,81 the government may avoid liability for the torts of its em-
ployees by asserting the qualified immunity possessed by the tort-
feasing employees.82
74. See Bell, supra note 70, at 2 n.5; Dolan, supra note 72, at 297.
75. Bell, supra note 70, at 6; Dolan, supra note 72, at 297; Vaughn, supra note 33, at 107.
76. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), defined the qualified
immunity available to state government officials:
[IEn varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discre-
tion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasona-
bly appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a
basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct.
Id. at 247-48. Butz held that, in most cases, federal officials are entitled to the qualified
immunity defined in Scheuer. 438 U.S. at 507.
77. See Bermann, supra note 33, at 1190; Dolan, supra note 72, at 297.
78. See Bell, supra note 70, at 4; Dolan, supra note 72, at 298.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 3680(a) (1976).
80. Section 2680(a) provides in part that the United States does not waive sovereign im-
munity for "[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (1976).
81. 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 393. For a discussion of Norton v. United States, see Note, Norton v. United
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Though all of Carlson's effects are unclear, some predictions can
be made. After Carlson, injured citizens no longer should be uncer-
tain of their ability to bring personal liability suits against culpable
federal employees. The test enunciated in Carlson will leave little
doubt as to the existence of a constitutional cause of action in any
given case.83 Another positive effect of Carlson should be that the
increased threat to government employees of substantial personal
liability will further the deterrence interest served by Bivens
suits.8 4
Several negative effects of Carlson are also likely, however. As
plaintiffs become more certain of their ability to maintain Bivens
actions, the number of such suits will increase even more rapidly
than at present. This increase will not be limited to cases in which
plaintiffs seek Bivens remedies despite the existence of an FTCA
remedy; rather, the number of cases in which plaintiffs seek recov-
ery against the offending government official despite the availabil-
ity of any statutory remedy also will rise.85 This increase in litiga-
tion obviously will add to the already overwhelming workload of
the federal courts.
Certainly Carlson will not relieve the fears of federal employees.
The possibility of personal liability will be even more threatening.
Moreover, from a plaintiff's prospective, Carlson will do little to
eliminate the impediments to compensation through Bivens-type
suits. In sum, Carlson seems to have made a bad situation worse.
By allowing more personal liability suits against government em-
ployees, the Court has intensified many of the previously existing
problems of constitutional tort litigation.
States: Federal Government's Liability Coterminous with That of Its Agents Under Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act Amendment, 57 N.C. L. REv. 350 (1979).
83. See Bermann, supra note 33, at 1189. Bermann remarks:
[P]rospective plaintiffs need a clearer idea than they can possibly have today
of the monetary responsibility of government and their officials. The current
proliferation of defendants in damage actions against public authorities may
not be due entirely to nuisance value, but may owe something to litigants' hon-
est uncertainty over what relief if any can be expected from whom.
Id.
84. See note 33 supra.
85. See notes 65-66 & accompanying text supra.
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A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION?
After Carlson, a judicial solution to the problems of the current
situation appears unlikely. In any event, the task of designing an
effective remedial scheme to compensate victims of the tortious
acts of government officials is more legislative than judicial in
character.8s Several advantages of a legislative solution are cogniza-
ble. Congress has access to a wider range of remedies than the judi-
ciary; Congress designs remedies to handle general problems, not
particular fact situations; and the choice of judicial remedies is
often merely a choice between those presented by the contesting
parties.8 7 Though Congress did resolve many inequities with its
1974 FTCA amendment, that progress represented "only a partial
step toward proper financial accountability by the federal govern-
ment for the injuries occasioned by its employees." '88 A comprehen-
sive federal statutory scheme allocating liability for the tortious
acts of government employees is necessary.89
In 1979, the Justice Department drafted legislation to solve some
of the inadequacies of the current remedial system.90 Sponsored by
Senator Kennedy and Representatives Danielson and Rodino, the
legislation would provide that the United States be the exclusive
defendant in all suits based on common law or constitutional torts
committed by officers acting within the scope of their office or em-
ployment.91 When the employee was not acting within the scope of
86. Bermann, supra note 33, at 1189.
87. Comment, supra note 8, at 412.
88. Boger, Gitenstein, and Verkuil, supra note 3, at 539. The authors conclude that
[t]he amendment provides a useful means for obtaining financial compensation
in the wake of certain grievous abuses by law enforcement officials, but Con-
gress should not be led by this action to believe that it has dealt with the
inequities of sovereign immunity, and the question of a citizen's right to re-
dress for constitutional wrongs, in any final or comprehensive way.
Id. at 542-43.
89. Id. at 539, 543; Dolan, supra note 72, at 309.
90. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S2919-23 (daily ed. March 15, 1979);
H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rc. Hl101 (daily ed. March 6, 1979). For a
discussion of similar bills previously proposed by the Justice Department, see Dolan, supra
note 72, at 299-302.
91. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 125 CONG. REc. S2920-21 (daily ed. March 15, 1979);
see 125 CONG. REC. Hll01 (daily ed. March 6, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). Congress has
provided for exclusive governmental liability for several classes of tortfeasors. See note 45
supra.
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his office or employment, but was acting under color of his office,
an injured plaintiff could sue either the government or the em-
ployee.9 2 A plaintiff-instituted administrative disciplinary proceed-
ing usually would be available against the offending employee, 3
and in an action against it the government could not avoid liability
by asserting the good faith defenses of its agents."'
Generally, exclusive governmental liability for most torts com-
mitted by federal agents would serve the interests of all affected
parties.95 One major point of controversy surrounding the legisla-
tion, however, is the scope and breadth of the protection of govern-
ment employees. The proposal would require exclusive government
responsibility for all acts committed by its employees within the
scope of their office or employment.96 Under this standard, govern-
ment officials may incur no personal liability even though they ac-
ted either particularly offensively or in bad faith.97 Justice Depart-
ment officials argued that the proposed legislation's administrative
disciplinary procedures would punish offending officials sufficiently
and deter further unconstitutional acts by government employ-
ees.9 8 Though internal disciplinary systems have significant posi-
tive features, 9  the threat of personal liability seems a more certain
92. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 125 CONG. REC. S2921 (daily ed. March 15, 1979). See
Dolan, supra note 72, at 305 n.149. One example of such a tort is the situation wherein "a
law enforcement employee ... uses his badge to gain entry into dwellings for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort therein." Id.
93. See S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. § 12, 125 CONG. REc. S2921-23 (daily ed. March 15,
1979); Dolan, supra note 72, at 303.
94. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 125 CONG. REC. S2921 (daily ed. March 15, 1979).
This provision would negate the effect of Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978), in which the court held that the United States can avoid liability by asserting the
qualified immunity of its agents.
95. See Bermann, supra note 33, at 1194-95, 1201-03.
96. S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 125 CONG. REc. S2920-21 (daily ed. March 15, 1979);
see 125 CONG. REc. Hll01 (daily ed. March 6, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
97. See Dolan, supra note 72, at 304 (citing Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act:
S. 2117, S. 2868 and S. 3314: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Share-
holders Rights and Remedies and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 408 (1978) (statement of John
Graecen on behalf of the ABA)).
98. See Bell, supra note 70, at 12.
99. See id. at 13; Bermann, supra note 33, at 1197-98. Despite these advantages, one com-
mentator has criticized the administrative disciplinary procedures proposed in H.R. 2659.
See Amendment of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ad-
ministrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
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deterrent to egregious unconstitutional acts.10 0 In sum, shielding
government officials from liability for particularly offensive con-
duct would further neither social nor governmental interests. 1' 1
In contrast to the Justice Department proposal, earlier legisla-
tion specifically recognized the necessity of ensuring personal lia-
bility for egregious acts of government agents. Senator Metzen-
baum introduced legislation in the 95th Congress that would have
made the government exclusively liable only for torts committed
by the agent "within the scope of his authority or with a reasona-
ble good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct."'1 2 Although
this standard would make the United States liable in most cases,
employees who act outside the scope of their authority or in bad
faith would incur personal liability. The proposed Justice Depart-
ment legislation, however, would protect the employee who acted
beyond the scope of his authority or in bad faith.10 3 Consequently,
although one should not overlook the positive aspects of the pro-
posed Justice Department legislation, the bill extends exclusive
governmental liability too far. Even the Senate sponsor of the leg-
islation, Senator Kennedy, recognized this problem in remarks
made prior to introducing the bill:
[t]he debate has focused on the breadth of the "scope of office or
employment" standard, and whether the United States should
be exclusively liable in cases where the improper conduct is will-
ful and wanton. I, too, am troubled by the prospect of immuniz-
ing employees who have committed egregious constitutional vio-
lations. In committee, we will explore this question thoroughly
Cong., 1st Sess., 120-21, 124-26 (1979) (statement of George A. Bermann).
100. See Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 129-30 (1978) (testimony of John H.F. Shattuck and Pamela S. Horowitz, American
Civil Liberties Union). The American Civil Liberties Union maintained:
We have no quarrel with giving the agency the "first crack" at disciplining its
own. Based on past experience, however, we are extremely skeptical about the
willingness of agencies to take meaningful disciplinary action against their em-
ployees. Too often conduct which would be condemned by an outsider is toler-
ated, or even approved, within the agency itself. For this reason, we submit
that the review and appeal procedures are wholly inadequate.
Id. at 130.
101. See Bermann, supra note 33, at 1196-97.
102. S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S11,048-49 (daily ed. July 18, 1978).
103. See authorities cited at notes 91, 97 & accompanying text supra.
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and weigh the competing concerns so that an equitable solution
is fashioned, consistent with the basic scheme of the
legislation.1 "
Congress could amend the proposed legislation to provide for per-
sonal liability in cases such as the ones that trouble Senator Ken-
nedy, thus giving an effective, equitable solution to the many
problems currently plaguing litigation over the tortious acts of gov-
ernment officials.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Carlson, neither injured plaintiffs nor government em-
ployee defendants were content with the ability of the legal system
to protect their rights. The absolute test enunciated in Carlson for
determining the availability of Bivens remedies against individual
officers likely only will exacerbate the situation by increasing the
number of suits against government employees, without increasing
the likelihood of recovery.
Relief must come in the form of a statutory scheme that recog-
nizes the legitimate interests of the injured plaintiffs, culpable gov-
ernment employees, the United States Government, and the gen-
eral public. Devising such a comprehensive remedial framework is
a considerable task, but the legislation proposed by the Justice
Department is a partial solution. Should Congress amend this pro-
posed legislation to allow personal liability in cases involving egre-
gious tortious acts of government employees, the Justice Depart-
ment's proposal would solve many of the problems of the current
remedial system.
G. P. W.
104. 125 CONG. REc. S2920 (daily ed. March 15, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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